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 1 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, QUESTIONS OF DEFERENCE & 
LEGISLATIVE FACTS IN A DIGITAL AGE 
Allison Orr Larsen 
AALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PANEL 
JANUARY 5, 2015 
When the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Shelby County v. 
Holder – the 2013 case in which it invalidated a key provision of the Vot-
ing Rights Act – the Chief Justice quizzed the Solicitor General with statis-
tics about voting turnout by race across the country. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do you know which State has the worst ratio of 
white voter turnout to African American voter turnout? 
GENERAL VERRILLI:  I do not. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Massachusetts. Do you know what has the best, 
where African American turnout actually exceeds white turnout? Mississippi. 
GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. But Congress recognized that 
expressly in the findings when it reauthorized the act in 2006. It said that the 
first generation problems had been largely dealt with, but there persisted signif-
icant— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Which State has the greatest disparity in regis-
tration between white and African American? 
GENERAL VERRILLI: I do not know that. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Massachusetts. Third is Mississippi, where again 
the African American registration rate is higher than the white registration 
rate.1 
To some, there may be nothing odd about this factual quiz at all.  The 
Voting Rights Act required more of Southern states than Northern states, 
and the Chief Justice was simply trying to expose that treatment as unwar-
ranted in a modern world.  But the comfort with which the Chief Justice 
unleashed the statistics and the little patience he had for the Solicitor Gen-
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School.  Thank you to Derek Muller for invit-
ing me to participate on this AALS panel and to my delightful co-panelists: Doug Laycock, Bill 
Araiza, and Bertrall Ross. 
 1 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), oral argument transcript 2013 WL 6908203 
at *32. 
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eral’s attempt to re-focus on the legislative record are dynamics that should 
give us all pause. 
The role of facts in Supreme Court opinions is changing.2 The ability of 
judges to find facts – without a hearing, without a subpoena, sometimes 
without even the parties before the court – is changing. In oh-so-many con-
stitutional cases, the big fight these days turns on facts – not “whodunit” 
facts but generalized descriptions about the world, so called “legislative 
facts.”3  A legislative fact gets its name not necessarily because it is found 
by a legislature, but because it relates to the “legislative function” or poli-
cy-making function of a court. These generalized factual questions are be-
coming more central to Supreme Court decision-making.4  And there is no 
better example of this in recent memory than the fate of the Voting Rights 
Act. 
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) was enacted in 1965 to address pervasive 
racial discrimination in voting.5 The VRA provided (among other things) 
that certain jurisdictions – largely Southern States that used literacy tests as 
a voting prerequisite and had low African American voting turnout – were 
required to obtain federal approval before changing any of their voting pro-
cedures.  The original law was set to expire in 5 years, but Congress reau-
 
 2 For my prior work on the role of facts today at the Supreme Court, see generally Allison Orr 
Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012); Allison Orr 
Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (2013); Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with 
Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757 (2014). 
 3 “Legislative fact” and “adjudicative fact” are phrases coined by Kenneth Culp Davis in 1942 to 
distinguish types of fact-finding in administrative agencies.  See Kenneth Davis, An Approach to 
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Procedures, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942). 
 4 See Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra at 61 (“The Supreme Court . . . opinions are chock-full of 
statistics, social science studies, and other general statements of fact about the world”).  For oth-
ers who have noticed this change see Tim Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Prin-
ciples and Constitutional Truths, 82 N. C. LAW REV. 115, 118 (2003) (“Constitutional law is 
now in the throes of a widespread empirical turn, a quantitative mood swing that is consistent 
with a more general societal turn toward all things scientific.”); Tracy L. Meares, Three Objec-
tions to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure—and Three Answers, 2002 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 851, 851 (2002) (“Recent studies show that, over the past decade, judges and law-
yers have begun to cite to empirical studies in their work with increasing regularity.”); Rachael 
Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 
136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 658-668 (1988) (describing historical accounts of the use of facts in ju-
dicial opinions and noting that “‘once heretical, the belief that empirical studies can influence the 
content of legal doctrine is now one of the few points of general agreement among jurists’”) 
(quoting John Monahan and Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Es-
tablishing, Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986).  Cf. Ellie Margolis, Authority 
Without Borders: The World Wide Web and the Delegalization of Law, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 
909, 912 (2011) (observing how the digital revolution has “blurred the line between legal and 
nonlegal authority in recent judicial opinions”). 
 5 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966) (“Congress assumed the power to 
prescribe these remedies from section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment which authorizes the Na-
tional Legislature to effectuate by appropriate measures the constitutional prohibition against ra-
cial discrimination in voting.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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thorized it several times, most recently in 2006.  Last year, in Shelby Coun-
ty v. Holder, the Supreme Court found the law’s coverage formula – how it 
determines which states or political subdivisions are subject to preclearance 
– to be unconstitutional.  The Chief Justice, writing for the majority, ex-
plained that the formula (which was written in 1965, revised in 1982, and 
reauthorized without change by Congress in 2006) was based on “decades 
old data,” “eradicated practices,” and needed to be “updated.” 
So let us return to the statistical quiz the Chief Justice administered at 
the Shelby County oral argument.  As the exchange demonstrates, the fate 
of the VRA turned on a key question of fact: had racial conditions changed 
in the South such that minorities were able to cast meaningful ballots mak-
ing the coverage formula of the law no longer necessary? 
This question was the subject of Congressional fact-finding when the 
VRA was reauthorized in 2006.  As the Solicitor General attempted  to ar-
gue in response to the Chief Justice, and as Justice Ginsburg detailed in her 
dissent, Congress “amassed a sizable record” documenting that “serious 
and widespread intentional discrimination persisted in covered jurisdic-
tions” making the old coverage formula still relevant and necessary.6  After 
holding 21 hearings and compiling over 15,000 pages in the legislative rec-
ord, Congress made the following finding:  despite the progress made by 
the VRA to combat racial discrimination, “second generation barriers con-
structed to prevent minority voters from fully participating in the electoral 
process” continued to persist.  Thus, the “evidence clearly showed 
the . . . need for federal oversight in covered jurisdictions.”7 
What should a reviewing court do with this sort of finding of fact? On 
the one hand, a court should perhaps defer to the finding because it was 
made by a politically accountable institution.  On the other hand, a court 
should perhaps not trust the finding precisely because it was made by a po-
litically accountable institution.  This question is critically important to 
constitutional law today and yet – in the words of John McGinnis and 
Charles Mulaney – it is “radically under-theorized” by scholars.8  With the 
notable exception of work by some of my co-panelists today who have 
done very valuable thinking on these issues, the typical scholarly response 
 
 6 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2635-6 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 7 Id. at 8 (quoting 2006 Reauthorization, 2(b)(2)-(3), 120 Stat 577-78). 
 8 See John McGinnis & Charles Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT., 69 
(2008) (responding to Court’s “confusion about fact-finding in the partial-birth abortion case”).  
For others who have joined this discussion see DAVID FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A 
UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 129 (2008) (“The standard of review of legislative 
fact-finding should abide by the same basic principle that guides the entire enterprise of judicial 
review when laws implicate constitutional values.”); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding 
and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1172-76 (2001); 
Caitlin Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L J. 1 35-
36 (2009). 
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has been to shrug and conclude that this legislative fact deference question 
can only be explained as opportunistic behavior – the Justices defer when 
they like the fact finding and do not defer when they do not.9 
Complicating the calculus in a dramatic way is the complete revolution 
in the way we access and use information.  Judges, like the rest of us, are 
now surrounded by infinite amounts of information.  The digital age 
changes not just the sources of the facts available to courts, but also the 
emphasis on facts in our legal discourse.  Flip through the U.S. Reports 
these days and it is not uncommon to read Justice Breyer’s views on neuro-
science10 or Justice Kennedy’s statistical analysis on the rate of fatal car ac-
cidents in police chases.11  The Internet has sparked a new hunger for em-
pirical support in judicial decisions and legal arguments. There is also a 
wide-open field of data to support that demand.  Consequently the factual 
dimensions of arguments (complete with supporting secondary authorities) 
feature prominently in constitutional decisions. 
So what? What is wrong with Chief Justice Roberts diving into the sta-
tistics himself to inquire whether the Voting Rights Act coverage formula 
was outdated?  To make an informed decision, shouldn’t he think about the 
same evidence Congress did when evaluating the continued need for pre-
clearance in the covered jurisdictions? 
Consider what happened in the days after the Shelby County oral argu-
ment.  Nate Silver, a well-known statistics guru, authored an op-ed in the 
New York Times on the subject.  “As much as it pleases me to see statisti-
cal data introduced in the Supreme Court,” Silver wrote, “the act of citing 
statistical factoids is not the same thing as drawing sound inferences from 
them.” 12 A “statistical sin,” Silver explains, is “cherry picking the evidence 
in this way,” because “it involves making misleading rather than merely 
 
 9 William Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact Finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-
Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 881 (2013) (explaining the divergent approaches to 
deference on legislative facts and acknowledging that “cynics can easily rationalize the divergent 
results by referring to the politics”); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
1169, 1175 (2007) (explaining why we leave some questions of fact to the legislatures); Derek 
Muller, Judicial Review of Congressional Power Before and After Shelby County, 8 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 287 (2013) (examining how the Court reviewed the record in Shelby 
County v. Holder); Bertrall Ross II, The State as Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial 
Distrust of the Leigislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027 (2014) (arguing “courts should en-
gage in credibility-questioning review of the record when the political process has malfunc-
tioned”); See also Daniel Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill 
of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945 (1999) (“The concept of deference remains malleable inde-
terminate and not well defined”). 
 10 Brown v. Entn’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2768 (2011) (Justice Breyer dissenting). 
 11 Sykes v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2267, 2274 (2011). 
 12 Nate Silver, In Supreme Court Debate on Voting Rights Act, a Dubious Use of Statistics, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 8, 2013.  Nina Totenberg of NPR went further in her criticism, alleging that the 
Chief Justice “misconstrued” the data.  Nina Tonteberg, In Voting Rights Arguments, Chief Jus-
tice Misconstrued Census Data,  (NPR Its All Politics, March 1, 2013). 
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imprecise claims.”  He cautioned against assuming the Massachusetts and 
Mississippi examples were representative of a larger trend, and he worried 
about using statistics to infer causality when that inference was not sup-
ported.  Note that Silver was not accusing the Chief Justice of finding 
faulty data – the Chief Justice’s numbers came from census figures and 
were part of the record.  Instead, the bigger problem, according to Silver, 
was “not with the statistics he cites but with the conclusion he draws from 
them.”13   
In an information age there are at least two different dangers with judi-
cial fact-finding: (1) a temptation to use off the record facts not tested by 
the adversarial process (either presented by motivated amicus briefs or 
found independently by the judge and his law clerks), and (2) the potential 
for misuse of data that is in the record because of a bolstered confidence 
with facts that modern Justices possess coupled with an empirical hunger 
for facts that we all have today. 
Even if this is true, an important question remains: If judicial fact-
finding is dangerous, can we be confident that legislative fact-finding is su-
perior to it?  It is all too tempting to exalt the virtues of factual investiga-
tion by an institution with the power to call witnesses and hold hearings 
and draft reports.  Alas, it is not that simple.  All too often legislative “fact-
finding” missions these days simply amount to political theater.  As Doug 
Laycock has explained “legislators can do serious investigations but they 
rarely do.”14  Unfortunately, many members of Congress do not even attend 
hearings where factual evidence is presented, and the ones that are present 
typically read prepared statements written by their staff as opposed to ac-
tively engaging with witnesses and posing difficult or probing questions.  
The Voting Rights Act, in fact, provides an interesting example.  When the 
House heard hearings on the reauthorization bill in 1982, no witnesses were 
called to oppose the bill.  As one Republican publicly commented, “the on-
ly critics were supposed to come from us, and we didn’t want to call them 
because we weren’t really critical of the act, only certain provisions, and 
didn’t want to be perceived as against the act.”15 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2007).  For others who 
have painted a similarly depressing picture, see Neal Devins, Congressional Fact-finding and the 
Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L. J. 1169, 1170 (2001) (“[W]hile 
Congress has superior factfinding capacities, it often lacks the institutional incentives to take 
factfinding seriously”); Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. the Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme 
Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337, 339-40 (1984) (“[T]he institutional capabilities of Congress and the 
courts to find and use facts tdo not differ sufficiently to justify the realignment of power wit-
nessed during the enforcement clauses’ modern period.”). 
 15 ABIGAIL THERNSTOM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 79-136 (1987) (quoting Thomas Boyd, Republi-
can minority counsel). 
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Moreover, legislative fact-finding is also complicated by the digital 
revolution.  The process is often tainted by lobbyists who each arrive at 
Congress with their own data and fact sheets and empirical “truths.”  The 
information age brings with it an infinite sea of factual information and it is 
very easy to either find data to support a pre-existing view, or even to pay 
to have that data manufactured and posted to the world for free.16  In Lay-
cock’s assessment, “[m]ost of the real discussions in which legislators 
‘find’ facts occur ex parte and off the record. The laws they enact are legit-
imate because they are responsible to voters and because this is apparently 
the best we can do, not because anything about legislative investigations 
inspires confidence.”17 
The bottom line, unfortunately, is that there can be no simple bottom 
line.  If ever the answer to the deference question was easy (defer to the 
branch with the greater fact-finding capacities), the digital age ushered in 
the end to that era.  The Internet changes the game.  It is thus incumbent on 
the next generation of legal scholars to ask about deference to Congress on 
questions of fact in a fact-intense world – a world where anyone with an 
iPhone can claim expertise on a factual debate in a matter of minutes.  I do 
not have the answer yet, but I do have a series of questions to consider and 
two preliminary suggestions for the way this deference question must be 
tackled in a digital age. 
First, we may need to get granular and look closely at the process that 
resulted in the fact finding.  Where do the numbers come from?  What were 
the incentives of those who provided them? Does the data come from a re-
port filed by a federal agency charged with addressing a problem (like the 
Department of Justice reports presented to Congress when the Voting 
Rights Act was reauthorized in 2006)?  Does it instead just magically ap-
pear in the record as a “finding” without accompanying witnesses or adver-
sarial testing? If a judicial fact, does it come after a trial or is it followed by 
a citation to an amicus brief? 
Second, we must be careful with the label “fact.”  Identifying what is 
and is not a fact is a tricky endeavor – indeed some academics say there is 
no difference at all between the two concepts.18  I resist that conclusion, as 
I have written before, because I think most lawyers are confident in their 
ability to know a fact when they see it and there is something trustworthy 
 
 16 For examples of this in the judicial context see Larsen, supra n 2, The Trouble with Amicus Facts 
at 1788. 
 17 Laycock, note 14 supra at 1175. 
 18 Ronald Allen & Michael Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 
1770 (2003); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992); John O. 
McGinnis & Charles Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 71 (2008); 
Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analy-
sis, 50 DUKE L. J. 1169, 1170. 
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about that intuition.19  To me, a fact in a Supreme Court opinion is a poten-
tially falsifiable statement that is typically supported by a nonlegal second-
ary authority.20  The problem, of course, is that thinking too hard about this 
definition will unravel it.  Many statements considered pure legal proposi-
tions – “separate but equal is not equal” – can actually be re-packaged as 
statements of fact – “separate schools psychologically harm minority chil-
dren” – without that much effort.  And naked statements of normative pref-
erences or value judgments – “abortion is hard on women”—can easily 
look like factual assertions once followed by a citation to supporting empir-
ical research. 
But even if understanding the contours of a factual claim versus a legal 
claim versus a normative statement of value is an exercise likely to cause 
headaches, it is an exercise we must undertake.  Return to the exchange be-
tween the Chief Justice and the Solicitor General about the fate of the Vot-
ing Rights Act.  I labeled that debate a factual one.  But am I right?  The 
majority opinion certainly reads as if the defect in the VRA coverage for-
mula is a factual one.  Indeed the Chief Justice includes a chart in his opin-
ion comparing voter turnout by race and by state between 1965 and 2004 in 
an effort to make the point he made at oral argument that the covered juris-
dictions have made much racial progress and that “current conditions” no 
longer justified the “current burdens” of the law.21 
Statistics and charts and data sure make a debate sound like a factual 
one.  But I doubt the Court really thought Congress got the facts wrong.  I 
do not think the problem is that members of Congress did not understand 
that the coverage formula captured states where voting turnout had im-
proved and missed states where racial discrimination persists.22  Instead, I 
submit, what is really happening is that the Court did not like the inferences 
Congress drew from those facts – specifically the decision that racial condi-
tions had not improved in the South to the point where it was wise to make 
a change in who was covered and who was not.23  That sounds like a differ-
 
 19 See Larsen supra n 2, Factual Precedents at 67. 
 20 For elaboration on this definition, see Larsen, 162 U. PA. L. REV. at 67. For an interesting take on 
the rise of these non-legal authorities and for an illuminating discussion on the difference be-
tween the legal and the non-legal see generally FREDERICK SCHAUER AND VIRGINIA J. WISE, 
NONLEGAL INFORMATION AND THE DELEGALIZATION OF THE LAW, THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL 
STUDIES VOL. 29, No. S1 (January 2000). 
 21 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2626-7. 
 22 Indeed the legislative record contains statements that explicitly recognize the changes that had 
occurred since the formula was originally written, and yet Congress reauthorized it anyway.  See, 
e.g. 152 Cong. Rec. H5133-02 (2006); 152 Cong. Rec. S8372-01 (2006); 152 Cong. Rec. S7949-
05 (2006). 
 23 Derek Muller helpfully refers to this disagreement as one over “fit.”  Congress thought the fit 
was good enough between which states were covered by the formula and where the problems of 
race discrimination continued to persist; the Court did not agree.  Derek Muller, Judicial Review 
of Congressional Power Before and After Shelby County v. Holder, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 287, 
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ent kind of claim than what we usually call a statement of fact.  That deci-
sion starts to sound more like a value judgment or a prediction.  Bill Araiza 
has already wisely identified this difference.  He calls these sorts of claims  
“evaluative facts” or “value based facts,”—the former reflects conclusions 
drawn from empirical facts and the latter includes judgments about morali-
ty.24  But I am not sure they qualify as facts at all.  They cannot be falsified, 
and no amount of adversarial testing or empirical support will alter the 
quality of the conclusion.  A prediction or value choice is a judgment call 
that can be informed by facts, but not a factual conclusion as we typically 
use the phrase. 
If I am right, then the question becomes about deference to legislative 
values as opposed to deference to Congressional fact finding.  And this is a 
distinction that carries a world of difference. While it is one thing for the 
Court to find the VRA formula based on stale facts; it is quite another to 
second-guess a Congressional decision that the law was still necessary.  
Many of the current Justices applaud deferring to political choices and val-
ues reflected in the legislative process.  This is what makes the factual label 
so powerful and perhaps so dangerous.  A “just calling the facts like I see 
them” mode of judicial modesty is, I think, not modest at all. 
Put simply, as constitutional law becomes increasingly steeped in factu-
al claims, we must guard against the understandable temptation to see eve-
rything as a question of fact: refutable, objective, and almost scientific.  
That use of the factual label translates to a very robust brand of judicial 
power.  If the Court finds the Voting Rights Act no longer wise or neces-
sary or justifiable as appropriate remedial legislation under the Fifteenth 
Amendment, then it can so hold (and take the political heat for doing so). 
But finding a constitutional flaw by faulting Congressional findings of fact 
as insufficient is no less powerful a judicial move, and certainly carries 
equally significant implications for judicial review and constitutional law in 
the future. 
 
311-12 (2013).  I think a question of “fit” is also a question of value; how tight is tight enough is 
a normative call and not a question that can be empirically tested or theoretically falsified. 
 24 William Araiza, supra note 9 at 895. 
